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Wild birds play a major role in the evolution, maintenance, 
and spread of avian influenza viruses. However, surveil-
lance for these viruses in wild birds is sporadic, geographi-
cally biased, and often limited to the last outbreak virus. To 
identify opportunities to optimize wild bird surveillance for 
understanding viral diversity, we reviewed responses to a 
World Organisation for Animal Health–administered survey, 
government reports to this organization, articles on Web of 
Knowledge, and the Influenza Research Database. At least 
119 countries conducted avian influenza virus surveillance 
in wild birds during 2008–2013, but coordination and stan-
dardization was lacking among surveillance efforts, and 
most focused on limited subsets of influenza viruses. Given 
high financial and public health burdens of recent avian influ-
enza outbreaks, we call for sustained, cost-effective invest-
ments in locations with high avian influenza diversity in wild 
birds and efforts to promote standardized sampling, testing, 
and reporting methods, including full-genome sequencing 
and sharing of isolates with the scientific community.
Avian influenza is a global threat to food animal produc-tion and distribution systems, as well as human health. 
However, sustained, comprehensive, and coordinated glob-
al efforts to monitor the continually changing genetic diver-
sity of avian influenza viruses circulating in nature are lack-
ing (1,2). Two avian influenza viruses are current pandemic 
threats: highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus, 
which has spilled over repeatedly to humans since its first 
report in 1996; and novel avian influenza A(H7N9) virus, 
first detected in March 2013, which has caused serious hu-
man infections across China. Wild birds played a role in the 
evolution of influenza A(H7N9) virus (3) and might have 
contributed to the spread of this virus to parts of Asia, Eu-
rope, and Africa after a 2005 outbreak in birds at Qinghai 
Lake in China (4,5).
Most recently, wild birds have been considered as hav-
ing a role in the unexpected appearance and spread of influ-
enza A(H5N8) virus in Europe in November 2014 and in 
North America in December 2014; genetically similar lin-
eages have also been found in South Korea and Japan (6). 
Concern about highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses has 
generated sporadic attention and investments paired to spe-
cific subtypes. For example, alarm about influenza A(H5N1) 
virus resulted in short-term spending of hundreds of millions 
of dollars for wild bird–related research globally. Although 
interest and funding has since waned, threats from avian in-
fluenza viruses remain, and H5N1 and H7N9 subtype virus-
es continue to cause human infections and deaths.
Wild birds are natural reservoirs for avian influenza 
virus (4,7), host a wide diversity of subtypes, and provide a 
dynamic population for viral evolution and transmission to 
domestic flocks and mammals. Most hemagglutinin (HA) 
and neuraminidase (NA) subtypes have been detected in 
wild birds, although some infrequently (8,9). Highly patho-
genic avian influenza viruses of poultry are defined by the 
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) as having an 
intravenous pathogenicity index >1.2 in 6-week-old chick-
ens and causing ≥75% deaths in 4 to 8-week-old chickens 
infected intravenously, or H5 or H7 virus isolates with a 
characteristic molecular sequence at the HA cleavage site 
(for full definition, see the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health 
Code [10]). Although these viruses are rarely detected in 
wild birds, they have been found in diverse wild bird spe-
cies from disparate locations and can be potentially trans-
mitted along transcontinental flyways (5).
Avian influenza rarely causes widespread deaths in 
wild birds, and influenza caused by H5N1 subtype virus 
represents the first major clinical avian influenza virus–as-
sociated disease recognized in wild birds since the out-
break of influenza caused by H5N3 subtype virus in South 
Africa in 1961 in common terns (Sterna hirundo) (7,11). 
Thus, limiting surveillance for avian influenza virus to only 
deaths of wild birds provides little insight into the diversity 
of avian influenza virus genotypes circulating globally or 
risk for future outbreaks in poultry or humans.
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Programs implemented during sporadic periods of 
concern (e.g., the Global Avian Influenza Network for Sur-
veillance of Wild Birds after influenza outbreaks caused by 
H5N1 subtype viruses in 2005 [12]) have provided useful 
data on avian influenza virus diversity for a limited number 
of isolates but have missed the opportunity to document 
how diversity changes over time (1). The situation for wild 
bird surveillance parallels similar constraints for surveil-
lance of influenzas circulating in swine, as highlighted in a 
recent review (13).
While focusing on wild birds, we recognize the ben-
efits of globally coordinated surveillance systems for all in-
fluenza viruses with the aims of multitype detection, whole-
genome sequencing, sharing of virus isolates, and analysis 
of epidemiologic data to highlight changes in circulating 
virus subtype prevalence. In contrast to our current system, 
which largely emphasizes reacting to new avian influenza 
viruses once they are detected in poultry, more upstream 
tracking of this information could potentially provide a 
critical early warning system or at least provide a sense of 
the likely evolution and movement of these viruses so that 
more proactive action can be taken.
Wild bird surveillance information could directly ben-
efit human and animal health through understanding of how 
avian influenza virus genes flow into poultry, swine, equine, 
and human influenza viruses and could provide a basis for 
strategies that reduce their risk for introduction into agri-
cultural species and humans. The documented human case 
of influenza in Taiwan in 2013 caused by an H6N1 subtype 
virus (14) points to the potential value of broader avian influ-
enza virus surveillance in other species because this subtype 
has rarely been included in influenza surveillance systems.
In recognition of the potential benefits of surveil-
lance, the OIE–Food and Agriculture Organization global 
network of expertise on animal influenza (OFFLU) estab-
lished a working group on wildlife influenzas in October 
2014; this group has highlighted the need for wild bird sur-
veillance to understand circulation dynamics of avian influ-
enza virus and recommends full-genome sequencing (15). 
In April 2014, the Strategic Alliances for the Coordination 
of Research on the Major Infectious Diseases of Animals 
and Zoonoses identified avian influenza surveillance in 
wild birds as a top priority for collaboration as part of a 
10-year strategic research agenda (16). We review current 
surveillance efforts and provide recommendations toward 
establishing an effective surveillance program for avian in-
fluenza in wild birds.
Assessing the Current State of 
Wild Bird Surveillance
A global look at multiple major data sources on wild bird 
surveillance for avian influenza viruses by country has not 
been previously reported. An excellent review by Hoye 
et al. (1) analyzed 191 literature reports of wild bird sur-
veillance initiated during 1961–2007 and identified needs 
for a coordinated scientific approach, including refined 
sampling and screening strategies. Our analysis incorpo-
rates additional surveillance and viral diversity data sourc-
es available at a global level and assesses current/recent 
efforts to determine capacity and actions needed for an ef-
fective avian influenza virus tracking system in wild birds 
(online Technical Appendix, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/21/4/14-1415-Techapp1.pdf). Other sources of in-
formation (e.g., in local languages) might provide further 
useful information for future analyses.
OIE Member Survey
 Forty-six (25.8%) of 178 OIE member countries respond-
ed to an influenza surveillance survey (online Technical 
Appendix). Eleven (23.9%) of 46 responding countries re-
ported active (live birds) and passive (dead birds) surveil-
lance activities (whether collected specifically for the study 
or by other means [e.g., sampling of hunter collections]); 
14 (30.4%) reported active surveillance only; 14 (30.4%) 
conducted passive surveillance only; and the remaining 7 
(15.2%) reported conducting no surveillance activity. Sev-
eral of these countries cited a lack of funding as the imped-
iment. Of 39 countries that reported surveillance (online 
Technical Appendix), 23 (58.9%) specified testing for virus 
subtypes deemed to be a higher pathogenic risk to poultry 
and humans (H5, H7, and all highly pathogenic avian in-
fluenza viruses identified) and 9 (23.0%) reported that they 
tested to determine all subtypes found. Only 11 subtype 
combinations were reported through the OIE survey from 9 
countries during January 2012–March 2013.
OIE–World Animal Health Information  
Data Interface
A total of 116 countries submitted reports during the period 
examined (2008–2012) (17). Reports indicated that 82 of 
those countries conducted some form of avian influenza vi-
ral surveillance in wild birds (online Technical Appendix). 
One country reported highly pathogenic avian influenza vi-
rus (H5N1 subtype), 6 reported low pathogenicity avian in-
fluenza during 2008–2012 (including 10 HA segments and 
39 subtype combinations), and the remainder reported no 
viruses. The other countries did not report detection. Of the 
682 entries of highly pathogenic and low pathogenicity vi-
ruses detected in wild birds from the 37 countries reporting 
detection or suspicion of avian influenza, 244 entries were 
at the serotype (HA type or subtype combination) level of 
information.
Influenza Research Database
A total of 39 countries (online Technical Appendix) re-
ported wild bird surveillance. This surveillance, which 
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was based on species name, was conducted during January 
2008–June 2013.
Web of Knowledge
At least 54 countries reported wild bird surveillance during 
2008–2013. This surveillance was reported mainly through 
peer-reviewed literature.
We found that ≥119 countries conducted and reported 
some form of avian influenza virus surveillance in wild 
birds during January 2008–January 2013 (online Technical 
Appendix). We identified 3 trends in surveillance efforts 
and their implications for comparability of data, as well as 
opportunities for refining surveillance strategies to capture 
diversity of avian influenza viruses.
The first trend was sampling method (active versus 
passive surveillance; number of birds and species sampled; 
types of samples collected as cloacal, oropharyngeal/tra-
cheal, fecal, blood, or tissue samples; sampling site charac-
terization; frequency and seasonality of sampling) differs 
widely across surveillance programs. This finding is con-
sistent with analysis of surveillance efforts of Hoye et al (1) 
conducted during 1961–2007 and suggested that unstan-
dardized sampling approaches remain a chronic challenge 
for a global avian influenza virus surveillance system. Sam-
pling methods, although not necessarily a limiting factor in 
identifying the wide range of these viruses circulating in 
nature, pose difficulties in discerning the usefulness of a 
report and comparing fluctuations in subtype virus preva-
lence between years or areas.
The second trend was that testing and virus character-
ization protocols vary widely. Some countries or programs 
screen for influenza A virus, some selectively screen for H5 
and H7 virus subtypes, and some screen only for HA and 
NA virus subtypes, but not subtype virus combinations. Al-
though we acknowledge resource and capacity limitations 
for analysis, the high level of effort required to capture or 
sample wild birds argues for investment to test for virus 
subtypes in addition to those believed to be currently highly 
pathogenic, to sequence as many as economically feasible, 
and to share samples and genomic data widely. Sequence 
data are needed to effectively track viral diversity, spread, 
and evolution.
The third trend was that critical data are deficient in 
most reporting systems. Measures of sampling effort are 
often absent. None of the data sources reviewed con-
firmed that a country did not conduct surveillance, which 
confounded analyses of negative findings. Approximate 
location or date of positive and negative findings is often 
missing, which hinders spatiotemporal risk analyses. Be-
cause positive findings are commonly reported without de-
nominator data, especially for H5 and H7 subtype viruses, 
relative risk for spillover is difficult to assess. Only the In-
fluenza Research Database (18) enables aggregation of full 
genetic sequences. Finally, analysis of which types of sam-
ples yielded more positive results (e.g., cloacal swab ver-
sus fecal specimens) is not possible from these data, which 
limits their value in informing future sampling strategies.
We recognize that studies have had varied aims that 
contribute to differences in surveillance methods. Howev-
er, the lack of standardized, sustained, and targeted surveil-
lance prevents effective tracking of avian influenza virus 
diversity over time in the major reservoir for this group of 
viruses. Opportunities for systematic avian influenza virus 
surveillance could have been readily implemented through 
existing programs. For example, regional guidance through 
the European Union (EU) directives on wild bird surveys 
has promoted some level of comparability of data through 
a required uniform reporting format, which led to exten-
sive data sharing. In 2006, EU member states reported hav-
ing tested 120,706 birds (active and passive surveillance) 
in ≥330 species of 22 orders (19). Unfortunately, samples 
were not screened beyond influenza A virus (or, in some 
cases, H5 or H7 subtype viruses) under the EU directive. 
Future regional coordinated efforts could begin to increase 
avian influenza virus tracking even if only requiring full 
genome sequencing on a subset of samples. Ongoing sys-
tematic surveillance can inform avian influenza virus ecol-
ogy research, going beyond pattern descriptions or experi-
mental conditions by generating long-term data to address 
complex processes around dynamics of host immunity or 
viral diversity (2).
Capturing Viral Diversity
Improved understanding of avian influenza virus need not 
involve a monumental global effort but requires a shift in 
screening practices to move beyond emphasis on highly 
pathogenic avian influenza viruses. Where available, ge-
nomic sequencing for detection of avian influenza virus 
may provide more robust subtype findings.
A recent study detected by sequencing different HA 
subtype viruses that had not been detected by antigenic 
subtyping approaches (20). However, we call for a phase 
change in surveillance programs, which includes additional 
measures to track avian influenza virus diversity beyond 
subtype, at least in a subset of samples. Capturing informa-
tion on all 8 avian influenza virus gene segments by rou-
tinely sequencing wild bird isolates would enhance under-
standing of avian influenza virus dynamics even more. For 
example, influenza A(H7N9) virus that caused respiratory 
disease in humans evolved from genetic contributions of 
≥4 gene segment origins, including sources from wild birds 
(3). These contributions exemplify complex major genetic 
evolution around antigenic drift and gene reassortment, 
which subtype characterization alone does not capture.
The 6 less well-studied influenza virus gene segments 
may confer major determinants of infectivity, pathogenicity, 
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transmissibility, and host species susceptibility (e.g., the 
role of the basic polymerase 2 gene segment in host range 
and virulence) (9). Tracking gene segments may be espe-
cially useful for wild birds, given the high reassortment rate 
in their avian influenza virus genome sequences (21) and the 
unknown potential for transient genomes to become stable 
and pose risks for endemic infections or transmissibility to 
or pathogenicity in humans. As a long-term goal, surveil-
lance should be refined to maximize understanding of trans-
mission factors (e.g., host receptivity and susceptibility, 
host dispersal) and ecologic factors (e.g., climate-dependent 
viral persistence, migration timing and range) that drive avi-
an influenza virus prevalence in wild birds (22) and enable 
spillover, emergence, and maintenance (1).
Coordinating bodies, such as OFFLU, have an op-
portunity to develop specific standards for avian influenza 
virus diversity-oriented surveillance programs to ensure a 
clear strategy forward for the scientific community and its 
funders. Similarly, funders have a key role in driving ef-
forts to track avian influenza virus diversity but will have to 
embrace sustained screening efforts for highly pathogenic 
and low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses and promote 
the value of increased sharing of negative findings and re-
quire full-genome sequencing of avian influenza viruses, 
even if required for only a subset of samples.
Reporting Systems
Despite benefits of international sharing of avian influenza 
viruses, regardless of their pathogenicity, there is no stan-
dardized and comprehensive reporting requirement beyond 
highly pathogenic avian influenza virus and H5 and H7 
subtypes of low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses, nor 
adequate reporting incentives. Scientific journals and on-
line databases enable sharing of information from research 
projects, as well as from official government surveillance, 
but these sources inherently underreport negative findings, 
and the lack of standardization among studies reduces 
value to authorities responsible for prevention and control. 
Online databases, such as the Influenza Research Database 
and GenBank, provide forums for detailed and consistent 
reporting, including sequence data.
We urge avian influenza virus surveillance funders to 
require reporting of results to the Influenza Research Da-
tabase to drive sharing of metadata and genetic sequence 
information. This sharing would expand the utility of lo-
cal- and national-level data to feed into global data analy-
sis. The limited current comparability of data can inform 
database directors on the need to harmonize data deposi-
tion requirements, improve interoperability, and encourage 
full reporting of negative and positive results to optimize 
tracking potential for avian influenza viruses. Ongoing 
discussions between coordinating bodies, such as OFF-
LU, database designers, and funders, might help improve 
efficiency and refinement of reporting systems and also en-
sure resource alignment across high-priority surveillance 
and reporting. Overall, a coordinated surveillance system 
should capitalize on global sharing tools to promote access 
to information that will support rapid detection of these vi-
rus and ongoing analysis.
Targeted Country Participation
A coordinated, annual surveillance system with a global 
perspective does not necessarily require participation from 
every country. Rather, resource allocation could be priori-
tized to provide sustained surveillance in a few targeted 
locations and in specific seasons that maximize informa-
tion on viral diversity relevant to potential spread (e.g., 
high-risk species, species interfaces, major staging and 
migration stopover sites, and reassortment hotspots [23]). 
Recent analysis of avian influenza virus subtype diversity 
and richness suggests that 75% of HA and NA subtype di-
versity in wild birds could be captured through targeted 
surveillance efforts in the Northern Hemisphere over a 
4-year period (24).
In addition, findings recently reported from the larg-
est avian influenza surveillance program in wild birds ever 
implemented (a study by the US Department of Agricul-
ture and Department of Interior in collaboration with au-
thorities in Canada and Mexico) suggested that hotspots 
of avian influenza virus in wild birds were primarily lo-
cated in the northern latitudes of the United States (25). 
These findings suggest that sites in the Northern Hemi-
sphere are high-yield starting locations for viral diversity, 
especially because we found that countries considered 
as major sources of avian influenza virus diversity (e.g., 
Canada, China, Germany, Mongolia, Norway, Russia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States) have reported 
surveillance data since 2008, but to different data portals 
(Figure; online Technical Appendix).
Coordinating extant programs in areas with major 
roles in avian influenza virus diversity would be a cost-
effective first measure. Although we propose an initial 
focus on the Northern Hemisphere to leverage current 
investments and target surveillance on the basis of prior 
avian influenza study findings reported above (24,25), we 
do not intend to undermine the role of efforts elsewhere. 
We especially acknowledge that bias in surveillance effort 
has limited current knowledge on avian influenza virus 
diversity in the Southern Hemisphere (4). Surveillance in 
the Southern Hemisphere, where resources are available, 
provides highly useful information on exchange in the 
avian influenza virus genetic pool through bird migration 
(migration–shedding dynamics may enable avian influ-
enza virus dispersal over extensive distances [5]), poultry 
trade, and maintenance of some specific phylogenetic lin-
eages of these viruses.
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Study Limitations
Our analysis was intended to provide a snapshot of recent 
avian influenza virus surveillance effort in wild birds to 
explore how existing infrastructure could be optimized to 
capture viral diversity. There are limitations of our study, 
including information missed through our data compilation 
methods. Only a subset of OIE member countries respond-
ed to the survey, and some responses were incomplete or 
unclear, which was potentially caused by instructions or 
language barriers. In addition, because only highly patho-
genic influenza viruses or influenza A H5 or H7 subtype vi-
ruses are required for reporting to OIE, data for low patho-
genicity avian influenza viruses were reported voluntarily 
by countries. Thus, reports to OIE cannot be assumed to 
be comprehensive.
We targeted information specific for wild birds, but it 
was not always possible from the data sources reviewed to 
determine whether animals were truly free-ranging or cap-
tive (e.g., data from the World Animal Health Information 
Data Interface [WAHID] was specific for wild species but 
did not distinguish by setting, which might show different 
dynamics for avian influenza viruses). Articles reporting 
surveillance from the Web of Knowledge were reviewed 
for specific parameters (e.g., time frame, wild bird species), 
but this method excluded papers not explicitly reporting 
this information. Additional relevant papers were likely 
available through other databases.
Non-reporting does not indicate lack of surveillance 
and likely increases the number of countries actually con-
ducting surveillance. We also recognize that reports of 
surveillance are not always verified for accuracy, and sur-
veillance at one time point might not  indicate current ca-
pacity. We included sampling effort reported that occurred 
during 2008–2013, but not all data sources spanned that 
time frame (e.g., the OIE survey only reflected 1 year of ac-
tivities). Last, because in some cases it was not possible to 
ascertain the lead institution organizing surveillance efforts 
in a given country (government versus in-country research 
organizations or outside institutions), this information was 
not compiled. We acknowledge that outside research might 
not be indicative of true in-country capacity and might have 
different implications for reporting. Despite several limi-
tations, our findings suggest that investments have been 
recently made for surveillance in most countries and thus 
provide a starting infrastructure for capturing avian influ-
enza virus diversity.
A Cost-effective Surveillance System
Establishing collaborative networks among countries 
would be cost-effective, reduce the need for additional 
 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 21, No. 4, April 2015 2015 e5
Figure. Feasibility of 
coordinating and improving 
avian influenza surveillance in 
wild birds where viral diversity 
is highest. Countries in red, 
orange, and yellow currently 
self-report some type of 
avian influenza surveillance 
in wild birds (For a country 
list, see online Technical 
Appendix, http://wwwnc.
cdc.gov/EID/article/21/4/14-
1415-Techapp1.pdf). Country 
income levels, based on gross 
domestic product, further 
suggest financial capacity to 
contribute to a coordinated 
surveillance system. The polar 
view emphasizes where most 
avian influenza viral diversity 
is circulating.
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laboratory capacity in regions of interest for surveillance, 
and complement and support other surveillance programs 
in maintaining trained and operational field teams in tar-
geted locations, instead of rebuilding local capacity and 
logistics for each new avian influenza virus threat. A more 
robust understanding of virus diversity and changing vi-
ral trends might inform biosecurity efforts at the wildlife/
domestic animal interface in which virus spillover might 
occur. This understanding has potential value, given dev-
astation from the death or culling of millions of birds 
during 1 outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(26), because surveillance provides information on genes 
of low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses that could 
recombine or mutate to produce high pathogenic avian in-
fluenza viruses (27).
Stronger capacity for early detection of changing 
avian influenza virus dynamics in reservoir populations 
may provide inputs to support public health and pandemic 
preparedness. These inputs include potentially useful ge-
netic material for vaccine development, detection of virus 
origins, refined diagnostic capacity beyond influenza A 
screening, improved understanding of molecular determi-
nants of transmission and pathogenesis from gene segment 
characterization, and analysis of the potential for virus 
spread through migration and trade (28).
The cost of avian influenza virus outbreaks in poultry 
is substantial; outbreaks of influenza A(H5N1) virus during 
2004–2009 caused US $30 billion in damage (29), and the 
frequency of highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks 
in poultry appears to be increasing (11). Rather than spo-
radically releasing large amounts of funding for wild bird 
surveillance when specific avian influenza viruses emerge, 
sustained national, regional, and global investments can 
provide the targeted baseline level of systematic surveil-
lance we propose. Many countries, especially where avian 
influenza virus diversity in wild birds is highest, are already 
investing in some form of avian influenza virus surveil-
lance in wild birds.
Current efforts should be refined by leveling the invest-
ment roller coaster that has funded subtype-specific wild 
bird surveillance toward a lower-cost but long-term invest-
ment in collecting and sequencing wild bird avian influ-
enza viruses. Global coordinating bodies, such as OFFLU 
(a network linking influenza experts and laboratories work-
ing with poultry and swine influenzas and World Health 
Organization expertise) (13), provide collaborative forums 
for government agencies and researchers to compile and 
share sequences and isolates. For wild bird avian influenza 
viruses specifically and all influenza viruses, we would be 
remiss not to work toward coordinated surveillance to sup-
port more effective assessment, preparation, and response 
for emerging influenza viruses that pose potential public 
health threats.
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